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 In South Africa third party litigation funding agreement as a tool 
that provides access to justice is not legislated with regard to 
non-lawyers. This article is based on research conducted to 
determine whether regulating this type of agreement would 
facilitate in fostering the policy that favours access to justice. A 
brief comparative study showed that English law permits third 
party litigation funding agreements in the Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990. However, unlike in South African law, English 
law also has a body that regulates the conclusion of third party 
litigation funding agreements. The Association of Litigation 
Funders introduced a voluntary Code of Conduct for Litigation 
Funders in 2011 and an updated one in 2016, which regulates 
the conclusion of third party litigation funding agreements. The 
Code of Conduct protects the litigant against abuse by the funder 
and the funder against non-compliance by the litigant. Despite 
being a "self-regulatory" legislative initiative that governs most of 
the funding agreements in England, this Code does not bind 
non-members of the Association. In South Africa there is no such 
voluntary regulation of third party litigation funding agreements. 
Consequently, litigants may be prejudiced by the litigation funder 
in instances where a funder receives a disproportionate 
percentage of the capital award. The study on which this article 
draws investigated whether there is a need for an effective 
legislative response that regulates third party litigation funding 
agreements in South Africa. It was found that there is a need for 
formal regulation with regard to third party litigation funding 
agreements because there are no clear guidelines on the 
conclusion of the agreements in South Africa. 
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1  Introduction 
Third party litigation funding agreements are defined as those agreements 
in terms of which a person (a non-lawyer funder or a layman) provides a 
litigant with funds to prosecute an action in return for a share of the proceeds 
of the legal action if the litigation is successful.1 In South Africa the other 
known third party litigation funding agreements that are regulated are the 
contingency fee agreements. This kind of agreement is between a practising 
lawyer and a litigant, whereby a legal practitioner and the litigant agree on 
the payment of the legal fees only upon the achievement of success in the 
legal proceedings.2 The contingency fee agreements are a sub-species of 
third party litigation funding agreements and are regulated by the 
Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997. Contingency fee agreements can be 
defined as agreements whereby a legal practitioner and the litigant agree 
on the payment of the legal fees only upon the achievement of success in 
the legal proceedings.3 (It is thus a "no success, no fee" agreement.)4 This 
article will discuss the regulation of third party litigation funding agreements 
as they apply to non-lawyer funders which are unregulated by the 
Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997. 
In English law, contingency fee agreements as known in South Africa are 
known as conditional fee agreements.5 Just like third party litigation funding 
agreements, the Courts and Legal Services Act regulate the other funding 
agreements that are utilised by lawyers, which are conditional fee 
agreements and damages-based agreements.6 Also, in English law 
maintenance and champerty are terms associated with agreements which 
may contravene public policy as encouraging speculative litigation.7 For the 
purposes of this article, the meaning of maintenance is limited to "the 
procurement or assignment, by direct or indirect financial assistance of 
                                            
  Mpho Justice Khoza. LLB, LLM (UNISA). Lecturer, Department of Private Law, 
UNISA, South Africa. E-mail: khozamjay@gmail.com. 
1  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-Operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 66 
(SCA) 66 (Headnote) (Hereafter Price Waterhouse Coopers). 
2  The South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v The Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development (The Road Accident Fund Intervening) 2013 2 All 
SA 96 (GNP) 98. 
3  The South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v The Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development (The Road Accident Fund Intervening) 2013 2 All 
SA 96 (GNP) 98. 
4  Section 2(1)(a) of the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997. 
5  Section 58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990; also see Druker Contingency 
Fees 81. 
6  Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990, ss 58B, 58 and 58AA. 
7  Beatson, Burrows and Cartwright Contract 390. 
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another person to institute, carry on or defend civil proceedings without 
lawful justification."8 Champerty is defined as "the support of litigation by a 
stranger in return for a share of the proceeds of the action."9 Both of these 
agreements were considered to be contrary to public policy.10 
Third party litigation funding agreements have been debated for centuries, 
especially regarding their legality. It is with the constant shift of attitudes that 
these agreements are now part of a policy that guarantees access to justice. 
Most of the common law jurisdictions allow financial assistance to be given 
to litigants by third party litigation funders with the condition that should the 
litigant succeed in the funded litigation the funder would deduct a certain 
specified percentage from the capital amount awarded to the litigant.  
However, in South Africa there is no legislation governing third party 
litigation funding agreements for non-lawyers. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-Operative 
Ltd11 watered down the prohibition of third party litigation funding 
agreements for non-lawyers after being encouraged to do so by the 
legislature's regulation of contingency fee agreements through the 
Contingency Fees Act.12 There thus seems to be limited academic literature 
available on third party litigation funding in South Africa. There has been no 
attempt by the legislature to formulate formal legislation dealing with third 
party litigation funding. In most constitutionally governed jurisdictions13 it 
seems to be the commonly held position that access to justice will be 
strengthened if new forms of funding litigation are permitted to provide 
litigants with the possibility of pursuing their claims.14 In South Africa the 
right to access to justice is enshrined in section 34 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
This article poses two main questions: firstly, whether the non-regulation of 
third party litigation in South Africa is appropriate, as the industry is still 
growing; and secondly, what the implications of regulating third party 
litigation funding might be for both the litigant and the defendant. These 
questions are answered by considering the purpose and implications of self-
regulation by litigation funders and the government regulation of third party 
                                            
8  Law Commission of England Proposal for Reform para [9]. 
9  Middleton and Rowley Cook on Costs 176. 
10  Price Waterhouse Coopers 74. 
11  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-Operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 66 
(SCA). 
12  Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997. 
13  Eg Australia, New Zealand, England and Canada. 
14  See eg Hurter 2011 CILSA 424. 
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litigation. The position in foreign jurisdiction is taken into consideration as it 
has persuasive force regarding the regulation of third party litigation funding 
agreements.15 Specific comparison will be made between South African and 
English law. 
This article contributes towards the development of a model that is better 
suited to address the pitfalls of third party litigation funding agreements. Part 
two of the article provides a brief historical overview of third party litigation 
funding agreements. Part three provides a discussion of third party litigation 
funding agreements in South Africa. Part four of the article compares the 
South African law position with the English law position regarding the 
regulation of third party litigation funding agreements. Recommendations 
are made and conclusions are drawn made in parts five and six of the article. 
2  A historical overview of third party litigation funding 
agreements 
South Africa has a mixed legal system consisting of Roman, Roman-Dutch 
and English law, which greatly influenced the development of third party 
litigation funding agreements. In Roman and Roman-Dutch law third party 
litigation funding agreements are known as pactum de quota litis. In terms 
of these agreements one party undertakes to provide funds for litigation by 
the other party in exchange for a share of the proceeds, should the case be 
successful.16 The agreements were regarded with distaste as they were 
considered to encourage speculative litigation and thus amounted to an 
abuse of the legal process.17 This adverse view was held, whether the 
funding was by lawyers or non-lawyers. 
The earliest reported case in South Africa that applied the Roman-Dutch 
law authorities is Hollard v Zietsman.18 In this case the advocate for the 
defendant argued that English law on champerty and maintenance is 
stronger than Roman law.19 This may explain the tendency of the courts to 
apply English law in third party litigation funding arrangements. The purpose 
of the Roman-Dutch rule pactum de quota litis was to deter attorneys and 
advocates from speculating in litigation.20 After both advocates for plaintiff 
and defendant had canvassed Roman and Roman-Dutch law authorities on 
                                            
15  Section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
16  Hutchison and Pretorius Contract 183. 
17  Price Waterhouse Coopers 74. 
18  Hollard v Zietsman 1885 6 NLR 93. 
19  Hollard v Zietsman 1885 6 NLR 93; also see Price Waterhouse Coopers 82. 
20  Hollard v Zietsman 1885 6 NLR 93; also see Price Waterhouse Coopers 76. 
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litigation funding, the court concluded that it is not illegal to agree with 
another to bear part of that other's costs of litigation, but agreements to 
purchase the subject matter of a suit (de quota litis or champerty) are 
illegal.21 English common law condemned champerty as protecting the 
integrity of the judicial system because of the fear that champertous 
agreements could give rise to abuse such as the inflation of damages, the 
suppression of evidence, and the suborning of witnesses.22 In 1995 the 
English court in Aratra Potato Co v Taylor Johnson Garrett23 found that it 
was champertous to agree on a differential fee arrangement depending on 
the outcome of the case. This view has also been expressed in early South 
African cases and more specifically in Campbell v Welverdiend Diamonds 
Ltd,24 where the court stated: 
It is clear from the authorities that while a transaction of this kind may be 
properly entered into, and may be supported where it is a genuine case of 
assisting a litigant for a fair recompense, it cannot be supported in other cases; 
a court is not to give effect to arrangements which are made by persons who 
traffic in litigation. 
In South Africa, however, it has long been accepted that an agreement to 
assist a litigant in exchange for a percentage of the proceeds (a pactum de 
quota litis) is lawful, provided that it was entered into in good faith, and with 
the object of assisting the litigant in the exercise of his rights.25 The partial 
acceptance of third party litigation funding was foreshadowed in a 
paradoxical dictum in Patz v Salzburg,26 where Innes CJ stated: 
[O]f course it is against public policy to traffic or gamble in lawsuits, or to 
maintain them for speculative or wrongful purposes. That is both English and 
Roman-Dutch law. But it is not unlawful bona fide and properly to assist a 
litigant to defend or establish his rights, even though the person so assisting 
may derive some benefit from the subject-matter of the action. 
In Patz v Salzburg27 the court showed its disapproval of third party litigation 
funding agreements when applying the English common law rule of 
champerty. At the same time the court seemed to be willing to relax the rule 
                                            
21  Hollard v Zietsman 1885 6 NLR 93; also see Price Waterhouse Coopers 78. 
22  Re Trepca Mines Ltd [1962] 3 All ER 351 355. 
23  Aratra Potato Co v Taylor Johnson Garrett [1995] 4 All ER 695. 
24  Campbell v Welverdiend Diamonds Ltd 1930 TPD 287. 
25  See Mayne v James & The High Sheriff 1893 10 CLJ 61; Hugo & Miller v The 
Transvaal Loan & Finance & Mortgage Co 1894 1 OR 336 340; Green v De Villiers; 
Dr Leyds & The Rand Exploring Syndicate Ltd 1895 2 OR 289 294; Schweizer's 
Claimholders' Rights Syndicate Ltd v The Rand Exploring Syndicate Ltd 1896 3 OR 
140 144; Patz v Salzburg 1907 TS 526 527; Walker v Matterson 1936 NPD 495 504; 
see also Scott 2004 SA Merc LJ 478. 
26  Patz v Salzburg 1907 TS 526 527; see also Walker v Matterson 1936 NPD 495 504. 
27  Patz v Salzburg 1907 TS 526 527. 
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by allowing such agreements where a bona fide third party who has no stake 
in such litigation finances the proceedings (maintenance), and also shares 
the proceeds (champerty). The dictum foreshadows a later development in 
South African law where the legality of agreements in which third parties 
fund litigation is recognised.28 Evidently, there has been a steady 
development with regard to litigation funding arrangements in South Africa, 
following the English law authorities on the subject matter. The development 
is discussed below by looking into South African court cases that ruled on 
third party litigation funding. 
3  Third party litigation funding agreements in South Africa 
It is trite law by now that champerty and maintenance contracts were initially 
perceived as contracts injurious to the administration of justice and as a 
result were regarded as against public policy.29 Christie and Bradfield argue 
that the civil courts are designed primarily for the settlement of bona fide 
disputes between litigants with or without the assistance of entirely 
disinterested members of the legal profession and those that do not have 
the right of appearance in court.30 Furthermore, they argue that any contract 
that does not fit this pattern of litigation may contain the seeds of injustice 
and must therefore be closely scrutinised.31 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National 
Potato Co-Operative Ltd32 held that third party litigation funding agreements 
are recognised in South Africa, because the civil justice system has 
developed its own inner strength. The court examined and endorsed some 
champertous agreements by holding that these agreements are not contrary 
to public policy or void, and that the illegality of these contracts is not a 
defence in action. The court further held that litigation pursuant to such a 
contract may where necessary constitute an abuse of process, 
                                            
28  See Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 (which came into operation on 23 April 1999); 
Price Waterhouse Coopers; De la Guerre v Ronald Bobroff & Partners Incorporated 
2013 JOL 30002 (GNP); see also Van Niekerk 2013 De Rebus 50. 
29  See Hollard v Zietsman 1885 6 NLR 93; Mayne v James & The High Sheriff 1893 10 
CLJ 61; Hugo & Miller v The Transvaal Loan & Finance & Mortgage Co 1894 1 OR 
336 340; Green v De Villiers; Dr Leyds & The Rand Exploring Syndicate Ltd 1895 2 
OR 289 294; Schweizer's Claimholders' Rights Syndicate Ltd v The Rand Exploring 
Syndicate Ltd 1896 3 OR 140 144; Patz v Salzburg 1907 TS 526 527; Walker v 
Matterson 1936 NPD 495 504; Fender v St John Midway [1938] AC 1 13; Price 
Waterhouse Coopers para 76. 
30  Christie and Bradfield Contract 367. 
31  Christie and Bradfield Contract 367. 
32  2004 6 SA 66 (SCA) 76. 
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notwithstanding a litigant's right of access to the courts enshrined in section 
34 of the Constitution.33 
This was the position for almost nine years after this landmark decision on 
third party litigation funding (non-lawyers). In 2013 the Gauteng North High 
Court in Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd34 further developed the 
landmark recognition of the Supreme Court of Appeal on champertous 
agreements. In short, the high court held that the litigation funder can be 
joined as a co-litigant in the litigation in order to be able to give a cost order 
against such a funder. The court regarded this to be a logical progression 
from the recognition that champertous agreements are lawful.35 It added 
that the ability to hold the funder liable for costs is one of the measures that 
the courts could adopt to counter any possible abuses arising from the 
recognition of the validity of champertous agreements.36 
Following the decision to join funders in the proceedings, the Western Cape 
High Court in EP Property Projects (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Cape 
Town37 (hereafter EP Property Projects) applied the decision in Price 
Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd38 by exercising its discretion to grant a 
cost order against a litigation funder who had been joined in the litigation. 
The court scrutinised the position in English law and other common law 
jurisdictions, observing that cost orders would generally not be granted 
against what it referred to as "pure funders". Pure funders are funders who 
do not seek to control the course of the litigation and lack any personal 
interest in the litigation.39 However, where the funder controls the 
proceedings and has a personal interest in its being successful, then the 
funder is not so much facilitating access to justice as he is gaining access 
for his purposes, and becoming the "real" litigant.40 It is then considered that 
he may be held liable for any adverse cost orders. 
Another decision of importance is Scholtz v Merryweather.41 The Western 
Cape High Court applied the distinction laid down in EP Property Projects 
                                            
33  Price Waterhouse Coopers 82. 
34  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd 2013 6 SA 216 (GNP). 
35  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd 2013 6 SA 216 (GNP) 222. 
36  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd 2013 6 SA 216 (GNP) 222. 
37  EP Property Projects (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town 2014 1 SA 141 
(WCC). 
38  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd 2013 6 SA 216 (GNP). 
39  EP Property Projects 162. 
40  EP Property Projects 164. 
41  Scholtz v Merryweather 2014 6 SA 90 (WCC). 
MJ KHOZA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  8 
(Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town,42 between the "pure funders" 
who are immune to adverse cost orders and controlling litigation funders 
who have personal interest and seek to control the litigation. The court held 
that the funder is liable jointly and severally with the litigant for the costs of 
the application because the funder had not only funded the litigation but had 
substantially controlled the proceedings by hindering the service of 
summons, consulting lawyers, and initiating the rescission application.43 
The funder also stood to benefit in that if the judgment could be rescinded, 
he would be relieved of his common-law obligation to support the litigant, 
who is his son.44 
The distinction between "pure funders" and other funders as laid down in 
the EP Property Projects45 was also applied by the Gauteng Local Division 
in Gold Fields Ltd v Motley Rice LLC.46 The court held that the funder was 
a "pure funder" because the funder would get no financial gain if the litigation 
was successful, nor did he exercise substantial control of the litigation.47 
The funder was merely facilitating access to justice and not "gaining access 
to justice for his own purposes."48 
Considering these developments it is prudent to look back at Wallis's 
remarks that funding provided by litigation investors clearly can be a viable 
way of providing some litigants with access to the courts, although 
restrictions on the types of cases which may be undertaken and potential 
ethical implications can be expected.49 There seems to be a proliferation of 
litigation funding companies in South Africa, as outlined below. 
In 2013 the first litigation funding company, called the South African 
Litigation Funding Company (SALFCO),50 was established. Other 
companies of a similar nature include Astrea, Christopher Consulting, and 
Litigation FundingSA. There are a number of other companies that have 
shown interest in investing in South African cases, such as IMF Australia. 
IMF Australia was engaged as a funder in the high-profile case of Price 
                                            
42  EP Property Projects (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town 2014 1 SA 141 
(WCC). 
43  Scholtz v Merryweather 2014 6 SA 90 (WCC) 114 (hereafter Scholtz). 
44  Scholtz 113. 
45  EP Property Projects 164. 
46  Gold Fields Ltd v Motley Rice LLC 2015 4 SA 299 (GJ) (hereafter Gold Fields). 
47  Gold Fields 324. 
48  Gold Fields 324. 
49  Wallis 2011 Advocate 35. 
50  Cokayne 2013 http://www.salfco.com/docs/SALF%20launch%20%20Press%20 
Release%20Pretoria%20News%203%20June%2013.pdf; Burger 2014 
http://www.werksmans.com/legal-briefs-view/let-litigation-funder-beware/. 
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Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd.51 A London-based funder, Calunius 
Capital, is another company which has shown interest in operating in South 
Africa.52 The emergence of these funding companies and individuals comes 
with many problems. These problems relate to issues of transparency, 
fairness to clients, the impact of the funder on the case, and the influence 
that the funder has on the overall decisions regarding the case. The 
problems that third party litigation funding agreements pose in England and 
in South Africa are similar. Beisner and Gary53 have outlined some of the 
problems with regard to third party litigation funding agreements in the 
United States of America. Firstly, they argue that the proliferation of funders 
will increase the volume of uncertain litigation as disputes are investments 
to them. Secondly, funders may try to exert control over strategic decisions 
relating to the case. Thirdly, funders tend to prolong litigation by preventing 
the settlement of the case. Lastly, lawyers tend to give less attention to the 
interest of the litigant, as the aim is to retain future business with the 
funder.54 The funders are not restricted to the percentage they generally 
charge clients, as in some cases they may charge beyond what is 
considered reasonable. 
The issue of concluding third party litigation funding agreements in South 
Africa has not yet been addressed, except for the aftermath of that 
agreement, when the matter is before the courts. The current state of third 
party litigation funding in South Africa is problematic in that it protects the 
funder more than the litigant as a client of the litigation funder. The litigant 
is not protected in terms of the National Credit Act55 or the Consumer 
Protection Act,56 as these agreements provide a wide scope of freedom of 
contract to the funder as the qui contractus initiat. In a case where the 
litigation is about land, for example, the litigant may end up losing half of the 
land due to the contract the litigant entered into with the funder. In terms of 
section 1 of the National Credit Act57 the litigant is not a consumer, and the 
agreement does not amount to credit. The reason why the agreement 
cannot amount to a credit agreement is that the funder becomes entitled to 
payment only after achieving success in the litigation. This means that the 
funder will get professional disbursements and remuneration without 
interest in the ordinary sense but with an agreed upon percentage of the 
                                            
51  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd 2013 6 SA 216 (GNP) 222. 
52  Vickovich 2012 https://www.africanlawbusiness.com/news/african-litigation-funding-
market-a- hot-potato. 
53  Beisner and Gary 2012 ILR 4-5. 
54  Beisner and Gary 2012 ILR 4-5. 
55  National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
56  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
57  National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
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capital award only when the case is successful, which is akin to a success 
fee. 
It is clear therefore that there is an imbalance in this form of agreement, 
where the funder can charge an exorbitantly high fee due to the risk 
undertaken, even though the case shows prima facie that it is meritorious. 
Although the Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 protects the litigants with 
regard to lawyers, third party litigation funding can result in unfair and 
abusive contract terms against litigants. This is so because the Contingency 
Fees Act58 which regulates funding provided by lawyers to litigants does not 
apply. There is no limit to the amount a funder can draw after the finalisation 
of a matter she/he funded,59 there are no mechanisms regulating how the 
fee agreement should be worded/the exact clauses that should feature in 
the agreement to avoid invalidity,60 and there are also no legal 
consequences for a failure to adhere to established standards.61 Although 
some practitioners seem to be confused about the application of the 
Contingency Fees Act,62 the Act has clear guidelines regarding its 
applicability. 
In the light of the above discussion of the academic literature and case law, 
it is apparent that third party litigation funding has recently become more 
acceptable in South African law and elsewhere. As a result, there is a need 
for a more robust regulatory scheme in South Africa. The discussion also 
indicates that the challenges that South Africa is currently facing regarding 
third party litigation agreements are similar to those in other jurisdictions. 
These include the involvement of cross-border funders who may influence 
our judiciary to view matters in a different light. It is worth noting that South 
Africa adopted some aspects – if not all – of third party funding from English 
law. A discussion of both jurisdictions regarding recent developments of this 
mode of funding follows below. 
4  Lessons from England 
It is not surprising that South African law was strongly influenced by English 
law as there are many similarities in the two jurisdictions with regard to the 
perceptions held in dealing with third party litigation funding agreements. 
This may be largely because of the common law system South Africa 
                                            
58  Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997. 
59  Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 s 2 (1) and (2). 
60  Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 s 3. 
61  Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997 s 5; Price Waterhouse Coopers) 78. 
62  Contingency Fees Act 66 of 1997; also see De Broglio 2014 De Rebus 53. 
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subscribes to. In both of these jurisdictions the courts have been 
progressive, albeit gradually, in developing mechanisms to solve third party 
litigation funding agreement problems case by case. The research reflected 
in the preceding section has established that the reliance on the court's 
discretion is not enough in South Africa to regulate the third party funding 
environment. 
The courts in both South Africa and England have consistently been 
antagonistically opposed to third party litigation funding agreements and 
considered them to be against public policy.63 In the event the legislature 
decided to unmask these agreements indirectly by introducing what in 
England is the conditional fee agreement and in South Africa is a duplicate 
by the name of contingency fee agreements. These were attempts to further 
implement the principle of access to justice and led to the acceptance of 
third party litigation funding agreements. 
In both English and South African law, a litigation funder other than a "pure 
funder" can in certain circumstances be joined as a co-litigant in the litigation 
in order for the court to be able to give a cost order against such a funder.64 
This development minimises the risk of the abuse of the justice system in 
both countries. In South Africa this has been effected in recent cases such 
as Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd,65 EP Property Projects (Pty) 
Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town,66 Scholtz v Merryweather,67 and Gold 
Fields Ltd v Motley Rice LLC.68 
The English law position can be established through a consideration of the 
findings of the research conducted by Lord Rupert Jackson in his review of 
                                            
63  See Hollard v Zietsman (1885 6 NLR 93; Mayne v James & The High Sheriff 1893 
10 CLJ 61; Hugo & Miller v The Transvaal Loan & Finance & Mortgage Co 1894 1 
OR 336 340; Green v De Villiers; Dr Leyds & The Rand Exploring Syndicate Ltd 
1895 2 OR 289 294; Schweizer's Claimholders' Rights Syndicate Ltd v The Rand 
Exploring Syndicate Ltd 1896 3 OR 140 144; Patz v Salzburg 1907 TS 526 527; 
Walker v Matterson 1936 NPD 495 504; Price Waterhouse Coopers; Master v Miller 
(1791) 4 Term Rep 320 340; Wallis v Duke of Porland (1797) 3 Ves 494; Alabaster 
v Harness [1895] 1 QB 339; British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd v Lamson Store 
Service Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 1006; Winfield 1919 LQ Rev 54; Law Commission of 
England Proposal for Reform para [9]; Giles v Thompson 1994] 1 AC 142 161; Aratra 
Potato Co v Taylor Johnson Garrett [1995] 4 All ER 695; Tolhurst Contractual Rights 
189. 
64  See Arkin v Borchard Lines [2005] EWCA Civ 655 para [41]; Price Waterhouse 
Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd 2013 6 SA 216 (GNP). 
65  Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v IMF Ltd 2013 6 SA 216 (GNP). 
66  EP Property Projects (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds, Cape Town 2014 1 SA 141 
(WCC). 
67  Scholtz v Merryweather 2014 6 SA 90 (WCC). 
68  Gold Fields Ltd v Motley Rice LLC 2015 4 SA 299 (GJ). 
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civil litigation costs.69 In concluding his research Lord Jackson noted that 
the regulation of third party funding agreements was insufficient and that 
there were few players in the funding industry.70 This led to the creation of 
a self-regulated organisation called the Association of Litigation Funders. 
This organisation provides guidelines on how to finance litigation through its 
Code of Conduct,71 which is not legislation per se but provides clarity on 
these kinds of agreements. 
The perception in both jurisdictions has been that third party litigation 
funding is nascent, and as such it does not need to be legislated.72 This 
opinion is largely shared by the litigation funders themselves. They argue 
that parties who use third party litigation funding are generally commercial 
or similar enterprises with access to full legal advice.73 This argument does 
not highlight the historical context in which litigation funders have been 
operating. Third party litigation funding has been an issue since the time of 
Rabin74 and Winfield.75 However, recent case law and academic discourse, 
especially that which is related to proponents of a free-regulation industry 
that operates beyond the compass of the law, treat this as a new 
phenomenon.76 Most cases in South African and English law that deal with 
third party litigation funding agreements indicate that these agreements are 
not new and that they create problems when they are not regulated. 
In English law, however, third party litigation funding agreements are not 
entirely unregulated. The Courts and Legal Services Act77 allows the third 
party litigation agreements and includes the definition of a funder. The Act 
also provides conditions applicable to the funding agreements and requires 
the approval of the Secretary of State or a prescribed person for certain 
funders. Key amongst these conditions is that the funding agreement must 
be in writing.78 Section 58B of the Courts and Legal Services Act79 also 
                                            
69  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs. 
70  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs 119. 
71  Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, 2011; Code of Conduct for Litigation 
Funders, 2016. 
72  "The point was made that third party funding is still nascent in England and Wales at 
the moment and that nothing more formal is required." Jackson Review of Civil 
Litigation Costs 119. 
73  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs 119. 
74  Rabin 1935 Cal L Rev 48. 
75  Winfield 1919a LQ Rev 235. 
76  Eg Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs 119: "I accept that third party funding is 
still nascent in England and Wales and that in the first instance what is required is a 
satisfactory voluntary code, to which all litigation funders subscribe." 
77  Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990 s 58B. 
78  Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990 s 58B(2)(b). 
79  Courts and Legal Services Act, 1990. 
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empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations after consulting with 
judges, the General Council of the Bar, the Law Society, and other 
appropriate bodies. The regulations have not been implemented yet. Thus 
there is still a vacuum in the proper regulation of third party litigation funding 
in English law. The litigation funding environment is still largely self-
regulated by the Code of Conduct of Association of Litigation Funders 2016 
in English law. The recommendations discussed below could provide more 
clarity on regulating third party litigation funding agreements in South Africa. 
5  Recommendations 
In view of the problems facing third party litigation funding agreements in 
South Africa it is imperative that statutory regulation be considered instead 
of relying on self-regulation by litigation funding investors as in English law. 
Just as in England, the industry has outgrown self-regulation, as the 
regulation is binding on members of the association of funders only, and 
non-members have no obligation to abide by the self-regulation. The third 
party litigation funding has already reached the critical point referred to in 
the Jackson Report of 2009:80 a point where regulation is necessary. If left 
ungoverned, South African third party litigation funding, like its counterpart 
in England, will constitute a risk to the market and to litigation.81  
To provide access to justice and minimise injustice to litigants the legislator 
must find means to regulate third party litigation funding properly. This is 
also in line with the principle of Ubuntu in the light of transformative 
constitutionalism in South Africa. This is also to meet the need for general 
fairness and in accord with the "restorative" spirit of the South African Bill of 
Rights. Surely third party litigation agreements have to be strictly regulated 
as a matter of fairness to avoid the disproportionate charging of litigants. 
Although this article does not intend to provide a blueprint to be followed in 
drafting a solution, the article shows the need to regulate third party litigation 
funding agreements. 
The recommendations that apply in South Africa are as follows: 
a) The South African jurisdiction should either utilise the Consumer 
Protection Act,82 or the National Credit Act83 (hereafter the National 
                                            
80  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs. 
81  Justice not Profit 2015 http://www.justicenotprofit.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
09/Final-TPLF-Paper.pdf. 
82  Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (hereafter the Consumer Protection Act). 
83  National Credit Act 34 of 2005. 
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Credit Act) in addressing issues with regard to third party litigation 
funding agreements, or introduce separate legislation. A schedule in 
the National Credit Act could be added in order to regulate third party 
litigation funding agreements. The rationale behind this 
recommendation is that third party litigation funding agreements are 
sui generis, but have some characteristics of agreements regulated by 
the National Credit Act. This is so because third party litigation funding 
agreements are concluded on the basis that should a litigant become 
successful in the litigation, the third party litigation funder will be 
entitled to his disbursements and a risk fee or interest calculated as a 
percentage. This form of credit advanced to a consumer should be 
within the control of the National Credit Act, because the agreement 
has the potential of containing abusive and/or unfair provisions which 
are unjustifiably harsh on the litigant to the extent that a successful 
litigant might end up with much less money than in the event of failure. 
A national regulatory scheme for litigation funding agreements should 
also require that litigants disclose the source of their funding so as to 
allow opponents to defend their cases adequately. This is to be done 
in order to grant the defendant an opportunity to know who is guiding 
the litigation strategy and taking the decisions on the other side (as it 
is naïve to assume funders will not take control of litigation where they 
have invested funds). Contracts of this nature are usually secretive, 
making it unfairly difficult to mount an adequate defence. In this regard 
the disclosure requirements would solve this problem.84 The court 
rules should require disclosure to all intimate parties of the means by 
which the litigation is being funded on the outset of the litigation 
proceedings, as recommended by the Institute for Legal Reform and 
the Scotland review.85 
b) The provisions regulating third party litigation funding should protect 
litigants who have inadequate income, are illiterate, and have little 
bargaining power, as well as small businesses, as they are susceptible 
to abuse by third party funders. The criteria for equity,86 fairness and 
reasonableness (the principles of Ubuntu) for both the litigant and the 
funder should be addressed by the regulatory scheme in the National 
                                            
84  Beisner and Gary 2012 ILR 14. 
85  Beisner and Gary 2012 ILR 14; Taylor 2013 http://www.gov.scot/ 
Publications/2013/10/8023/27. 
86  This is contemplated by s 3(d) of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005, where it provides 
that the purpose of the Act is to provide equity in the credit market by balancing the 
respective rights and responsibilities of credit providers and consumers. 
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Credit Act. The schedule wod take into account the socio-economic 
circumstances of South African litigants as consumers. 
c) The regulations should also address concerns about new entrants to 
the market developing business practices which bring the industry into 
disrepute or increase the potential for harm or loss to be caused to 
claimants. This could be achieved by compelling funders to register at 
a selected government agency such as the National Credit Regulator. 
The agency would then oversee their operations and review some of 
the unethical behaviours associated with third party funding and non-
compliant funders. This would strengthen accountability for the 
funders and provide litigants with a less expensive and more efficient 
way of addressing issues regarding the ethics of funders. 
d) The regulation of third party funding should be comprehensive to cover 
not just the relationship between the lawyer-funder and the client, but 
also the integrity of funding agreements, and it should supply 
protection from external challenges.87 
e) The regulation should oblige lawyers to advise clients who cannot fund 
their litigation to apply for third party funding in addition to other funding 
options. The lawyer should also advise litigants on the implications of 
sourcing a litigation funder. The kinds of litigation that are eligible for 
funding should be clearly outlined. These should be such cases as 
commercial disputes involving a capital claim of more than R2 million. 
f) The structure that the legislation should assume should resemble that 
of the English Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders.88 However, the 
legislation should be pertinent to the South African context. The 
preamble should emphasise the importance of the right to access 
justice. This should also indicate the necessity of prosecuting 
meritorious claims by funders. 
g) The legislature should incentivise funders to provide funding to a wide 
variety of claims, not only to commercial claims. This expansion of the 
possibility of litigation by litigation funders is also contemplated by 
Justice Jackson in his report, when he states that "… if the use of third 
party funding expands, then full statutory regulation may well be 
required, as envisaged by the Law Society."89 Funders should also be 
                                            
87  Hodges, Peysner and Nurse Litigation Funding Status 151. 
88  Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, 2016. 
89  Jackson Review of Civil Litigation Costs 119. 
MJ KHOZA PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  16 
encouraged to fund personal injury cases, so that in addition to 
contingency fee agreements, litigants can have the option to have their 
litigation funded by litigation funders. The funders should be restricted 
in the amount of success fees90 they may be entitled to, depending on 
the type of cases undertaken. There should be guidelines on the 
complexity and risk taken by funders in a case, as this will affect the 
success fee. 
h) In addition, the legislature should state clearly that the funder will be 
liable to pay adverse costs should the litigation fail. Although this 
requirement is contemplated by the courts in South Africa to afford 
more protection to the litigant, it should be one of the consequences 
that the litigant cannot waive. 
In view of the overwhelming criticism of the English Code of Conduct for 
Litigation Funders,91 it would be prudent for South Africa to regulate third 
party litigation funding agreements to avoid abuse – especially by new 
funders emerging with own practices that may result in exploiting litigants. 
The above recommendations could assist in providing guiding legislation 
that will enable both litigants and funders to operate fairly in dealings with 
each other. The regulation of third party agreements would not only provide 
the courts with oversight as in the case of contingency fee agreements, but 
would also foster transparency and prevent the overcharging of clients.92 
The research in formulating these recommendations is mindful of the 
surrounding legal framework and socio-economic circumstances in foreign 
jurisdictions and their difference from those that prevail in the South African 
context. 
6  Conclusion 
It is evident that the history of third party litigation funding agreements and 
contingency fee agreements is interrelated. Both of these agreements were 
prohibited in countries that were influenced by the English common law. It 
is also evident that there is growth in litigation funding agreements, as the 
article has shown that the growing number of third party litigation funders 
poses problems for the courts. Having considered the earlier and more 
recent research conducted on the subject, this article has shown in the 
                                            
90  "The higher fee is also referred to as the success fee" - Masango v Road Accident 
Fund 2016 6 SA 508 (GJ) 513. 
91  Code of Conduct for Litigation Funders, 2016. 
92 Justice not Profit 2015 http://www.justicenotprofit.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/09/Final-TPLF-Paper.pdf. 
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recommendations section that it would be beneficial to regulate third party 
litigation funding The article has also highlighted that new mechanisms 
fostering access to justice have proved to be useful. However, they should 
be looked at with particular care as they also pose potential risks if not 
properly regulated. Considering the rise in the number of reported cases, it 
is clear that funding for meritorious cases is in demand, and may give rise 
to abuse. 
The research shows that relevant legislation should provide guidelines on 
how to deal with cases where the identity of funders is not disclosed, and 
how to ensure fairness in the levying of funders’ fees. The element of the 
control of litigation by the funder should be regulated. This regulation should 
benefit both the funder and the litigant with regard to the control of the 
litigation. Disclosing the involvement of a third party funder to the other party 
to the litigation would change the dynamics of the litigation and in most 
cases balance the scales with regard to access to justice. There should be 
an incentive for funders to fund the meritorious claims of individuals who are 
unable to access justice due to monetary constraints, and the funding of 
litigation should therefore not be limited to commercial cases. 
This article indicates the need for the courts and the legislature to find 
means beyond those recommended in this article to properly limit the effects 
of third party litigation funding agreements. As indicated, a good starting 
point to look at for the reform of third party litigation funding agreements is 
English law. England is the only country that currently has a mechanism to 
regulate third party litigation funding agreements, although the system of 
doing so is flawed. It is also concluded that third party litigation funding 
should be fully regulated by legislation to protect the interests of litigants 
and defendants. The proposed legislation could resemble the Code of 
Conduct in England by the Association of Litigation Funders. The legislation 
should provide measures including but not limited to transparency in 
litigation funding agreements. Third party litigation funding and its 
subspecies contingency fee agreements have developed and are 
strengthening the right of many litigants to have their disputes adjudicated 
by the courts. It is suggested that there should be further research by the 
Reform Commission on the area of third party litigation funding. This can be 
done by drawing comparison with countries contemplating legislating third 
party litigation funding in order to implement better measures and further 
the public policy on access to justice. The doors for justice have been 
opened and a lack of funding is no longer a barrier to engaging in litigation. 
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